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Stablecoin Redemption Under Stress: Where the Custody Chain Breaks First

GUIDE

Stablecoin Redemption Under Stress: Where the Custody Chain Breaks First

Crypto Bank Editorial Team · November 18, 2026

A stablecoin’s market price is an output. It can sit at one dollar long after the machinery producing it has weakened, because traders keep it there out of habit. The informative thing to examine is the redemption path: the route by which a token becomes money again, and the custodians that route passes through. When stress arrives, that path tends to break at a custody link before it breaks anywhere else.

Three designs, three kinds of exit

  • Reserve-backed. An issuer holds cash and short-dated government paper and redeems tokens for money. The holder is in a credit relationship with the issuer and, indirectly, with every bank, fund and custodian holding the reserve.
  • Over-collateralised. Users lock more crypto than the stablecoins they mint, and positions are liquidated automatically if collateral falls. Exit is permissionless, but it depends on the chain, the price oracles and liquidations working at exactly the moment everyone is using them.
  • Algorithmic. Supply is managed against a paired token with little external backing. The exit leads back into the same system, so its value falls as more people use it. This design has failed outright before.

The rest of this piece concerns the first design, because it is the one with a custody chain.

Two prices, and who gets which

A reserve-backed token has two prices. There is the redemption price, par, available to those who can redeem directly with the issuer. And there is the secondary-market price, which is whatever the order book offers. Direct redemption is commonly limited to onboarded institutions, often above a minimum size and on a settlement cycle measured in business days. Most holders own exposure to the second price. The peg holds because the institutions with access buy below par and redeem at par. If onboarding pauses, minimums are large, or settlement is slow enough that nobody wants to carry the risk, that arbitrage weakens and the market price can drift while the reserves remain intact.

Quality is about solvency; liquidity is about Tuesday

Reserve disclosures emphasise quality: government paper, cash at regulated institutions. Quality decides whether an issuer is solvent. Liquidity decides whether it can pay redemptions on the timescale a run moves at. An issuer can hold excellent assets that take days to sell and still be unable to meet a wave of redemptions. That is the classic bank-run mechanism, and it applies here too. The useful disclosure is how much of the reserve converts to cash within a day, and whether any of it is committed elsewhere.

Circle’s 2025 annual report is concrete on this. About 88% of USDC reserves were held in a government money market fund managed by BlackRock, with the fund’s assets in the custody of BNY; the remainder, typically 10–20%, was cash in bank accounts titled for the benefit of holders. Circle also names “rapid redemption requests (or runs)” among its risks.

When the custody link failed: March 2023

Circle’s filing records what happened when one link broke. In March 2023 it had initiated transfers of more than $3 billion of deposits out of Silicon Valley Bank, but they “failed to settle” before the FDIC placed the bank into receivership. The funds were ultimately made available and moved to other banks, yet concerns about access “caused USDC to experience a temporary price dislocation on certain secondary trading markets” while banks were closed. Nothing was lost in the end. The episode still shows the point: a reserve that is safe in principle can be unreachable in practice when the institution holding it fails at the wrong moment. Holders who sold in the gap realised the dislocation.

When the regulator steps in

A different stress: issuance stopped by order. On 11 April 2023 NYDFS said it had ordered Paxos to cease minting Paxos-issued BUSD, citing unresolved issues with Paxos’ oversight of its relationship with Binance, while redemption at one-to-one continued for eligible customers (Paxos profile). Here the redemption path stayed open even as the product was being wound down, which is the outcome a holder should want and should not assume.

Questions worth asking any issuer

  1. Who can redeem directly, and what does onboarding require?
  2. What is the minimum size and the settlement time, and have either ever been changed under stress?
  3. Has redemption ever been paused, and under what authority?
  4. What share of reserves converts to cash within one business day?
  5. Which banks, funds and custodians hold the reserves, and in whose name are the accounts titled?
  6. If you cannot redeem directly: how deep is the market you would actually sell into?

The Custody Question, applied

  • Who holds the keys: to the token, you or your wallet provider; to the reserve, a fund manager and a custodian bank. See who holds the reserves.
  • Who insures it: nobody insures a peg. Bank deposit insurance limits are small relative to issuer balances.
  • What happens on default: depends on whether reserves are estate property or held for holders; see the issuer’s own risk factors and our insolvency guide.

Sources

Editorial explainer, not financial or legal advice. Crypto Bank is not a bank and does not hold client assets.