cryptobank
Crypto Bank is an independent editorial publication. It is not a bank, is not a deposit-taking or custodial institution, holds no banking, trust, money-transmitter or e-money licence, and offers no FDIC or FSCS protection. Nothing here is financial, legal or investment advice.
BTC $63,224-0.77% ETH $1,773-0.88% USDT $1.00+0.10% USDC $1.00+0.01% SOL $73.99+2.41% XRP $0.98+2.53% BNB $584-0.40% ADA $0.15+0.59%
Key Compromise, Not Code Bugs: Why the Signing Path Is the Custody Risk

GUIDE

Key Compromise, Not Code Bugs: Why the Signing Path Is the Custody Risk

Crypto Bank Editorial Team · November 18, 2026

For years, crypto security writing focused on smart-contract bugs: re-entrancy, overflow, faulty access checks. Those still happen. But the largest documented losses of the past few years point somewhere else, at the people, machines and interfaces that sit around the act of signing a transaction. For anyone assessing a custodian, that shifts the question from “was the code audited?” to “how is the signing path protected?”

The reference case

On or about 21 February 2025, roughly $1.5 billion in virtual assets was stolen from the exchange Bybit. On 26 February the FBI attributed the theft to North Korea, describing the activity as “TraderTraitor”. Fidelity’s bitcoin fund later summarised Bybit’s own account in its annual report: the theft occurred while Bybit “was making a routine transfer of ether from an offline ‘cold’ wallet to a hot wallet”. The funds were in cold storage; the attack succeeded at the moment they were being moved, when people and software had to approve a transaction.

The lesson is not that cold storage failed. It is that cold storage protects keys at rest, and every transfer out of it is a controlled exposure that has to be defended on its own terms. See cold, warm and hot storage.

The pattern: signers approve what they are shown

Multisig and MPC spread signing authority so that one stolen key is not enough. They do not, by themselves, guarantee that each signer is approving the transaction they think they are approving. If the interface that constructs or displays the transaction is compromised, several honest signers can each approve the same malicious payload, and the scheme behaves exactly as designed. The 2023 Ledger Connect Kit incident shows the retail version: according to Ledger, a tampered JavaScript library led users to sign transactions that drained their wallets, while the hardware devices themselves were not compromised.

What a code audit cannot tell you

An audit is a reviewer’s opinion on defined code at a defined time. It cannot tell you:

  • who holds signing keys or key shares today, and whether access was revoked when someone left;
  • whether the machine that builds a transaction is separate from the machine that displays it for approval;
  • whether signers verify the raw transaction on independent infrastructure, or trust a single front end;
  • whether the randomness used to generate keys was sound;
  • how unusual transfers are rate-limited, delayed or escalated.

These are operational controls. They belong in a custodian’s controls report and its policies, not in a code review. Our guide on reading a custodian’s assurance claims covers what to look for in scope.

What custodians say about their signing controls

Public disclosures are mostly high-level, but they indicate the design. BitGo describes qualified custody as “100% supported by cold storage” with multisig and MPC technology (profile). Fireblocks describes “offline transaction signing” and key material on air-gapped devices for its trust company (profile). Zodia says master keys are generated offline and stored in HSMs (profile). Gemini cites geographically distributed HSMs and MPC (profile). None of these statements, on its own, says how a transaction is verified before approval. That is the question to ask.

The insider dimension

Not every compromise is technical. Coinbase’s May 2025 disclosure described contractors and employees in support roles being paid to collect customer data; Coinbase states the incident “did not involve the compromise of passwords or private keys” and estimated costs of roughly $180 million to $400 million (profile). The data was then used for social-engineering attempts against customers. Access control, monitoring and the speed of revoking access are custody controls in the same sense as cold storage.

Questions for any custodian

  1. How is a withdrawal from cold storage constructed, reviewed and approved, and on how many independent systems is it verified?
  2. Can signers see and verify the raw transaction, or only a rendered summary?
  3. How quickly is signing access removed when staff or contractors leave, and is that tested?
  4. Are large or unusual transfers subject to time delays or extra approval?
  5. Does the insurance policy cover losses where authorised signers were deceived? Many crime policies treat that differently from theft. See insurance exclusions.

The Custody Question, applied

  • Who holds the keys: also ask who can approve, who can construct, and who can change the approval software.
  • Who insures it: read whether deception of authorised signers is covered or excluded.
  • What happens on default: a large theft can push a platform into insolvency, at which point segregation decides the outcome.

Sources

Editorial analysis, not security or financial advice. Crypto Bank is not a bank and does not hold client assets.